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ABSTRACT—In the wake of the financial crisis of 2008, there has been 
substantial debate about the wisdom of offering exemptions from federal 
securities laws for investment products sold solely to wealthy institutions 
and individuals, such as the accredited investor provisions of Regulation D 
of the Securities Act of 1933. Following an examination of case studies 
dealing with the derivatives craze of the mid-1990s and the aftermath of the 
2008 housing market meltdown, this Comment concludes that the now-
antiquated wealth-based benchmarks in such exemptions have resulted in 
the chronic underprotection of larger public and private investors. 
Accordingly, this Comment argues that several revisions to the existing 
benchmarks and related regulations should be considered. First, the 
numerical benchmarks in such exemptions should be inflation-adjusted and 
inflation-indexed from now on. Second, a series of graduated caps on the 
purchase of exempt investment products as a percentage of net worth 
should be introduced. Finally, the standard of care imposed on broker-
dealers who market and sell investment products to accredited and 
unaccredited investors alike should be raised to the equivalent of the 
fiduciary duty imposed on registered investment advisers. 
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The federal securities laws in the United States frequently rely on the 
notion that institution size and personal wealth are useful proxies for 
investor sophistication. A multitude of exemptions for wealthy individuals 
and large institutions in the Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act) leave such 
groups less protected by the mandated-disclosure regime of federal 
regulation than the average investor.1 Based on these exemptions, issuers 
 
1  Many of these mandatory disclosures apply only to registered offerings, leaving investors who 
purchase exempt securities less protected. In contrast to the federal disclosure-based regime, many state 
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and underwriters can sell securities to certain wealthy investors without 
enduring the legal and accounting costs of preparing a registration 
statement, opting instead to use a less costly private placement 
memorandum as a marketing document. 
In light of such exemptions, it is interesting to note, as litigator 
Lawrence Melton has, that the original text of the 1933 Act and the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act) are both “silent on the issue of 
investor sophistication.”2 Melton argues that a lack of distinctions for the 
protections afforded to investors large and small “is in keeping with the 
fundamental precept of American jurisprudence,” which endeavors to treat 
all individuals identically, whether they are “giants” or “pygmies.”3 
The statutory use of sophistication proxies may stem from a desire to 
codify the 1953 Supreme Court decision in SEC v. Ralston Purina Co.4 In 
this influential opinion, the Court held that the § 4(2) exemption of the 1933 
Act—which does not mention sophistication—was intended to apply to 
purchasers “able to fend for themselves.”5 Building on Ralston Purina’s 
premise, the “sophisticated investor doctrine” extended the Court’s 
reasoning to a variety of contexts,6 including so-called suitability cases 
where investors pursue claims against broker-dealers for unsuitable 
investment recommendations.7 
Several decades after Ralston Purina, lawmakers and Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) regulators began to embrace exemptions that 
substituted numerical benchmarks based on personal wealth or institution 
size as bright-line standards for the difficult-to-quantify concept of investor 
sophistication.8 A prime example is the Rule 215 and Regulation D 
definition of “accredited investor,” which allows qualifying offerings sold 
 
“blue sky laws” incorporate some merit-based regulation of securities offerings. See ALAN R. 
PALMITER, SECURITIES REGULATION: EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS 43 (5th ed. 2011). 
2  Lawrence C. Melton, Giants and Pygmies: The Fallacies of the Sophisticated Investor Doctrine, 
PIABA B.J., Winter 2006, at 64, 64. 
3  Id. Melton’s title references Justice Douglas’s observation that “[t]he [1934] Act does not speak in 
terms of ‘sophisticated’ as opposed to ‘unsophisticated’ people dealing in securities. The rules when the 
giants play are the same as when the pygmies enter the market.” Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 
506, 526 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
4  346 U.S. 119 (1953). 
5  Id. at 125. 
6  See infra Part II.B. 
7  If a defendant can persuade a court or arbitrator that a plaintiff has sufficient knowledge and 
experience to evaluate the risks of investing, a suitability claim is less likely to succeed. See Edward 
Pekarek & Christian Obremski, Is the Sophisticated Investor Theory Still Relevant?, SEC. LITIG. & ARB. 
(Feb. 2, 2011, 6:28 PM), http://nysbar.com/blogs/SecuritiesLitigation/2011/02/is_the_sophisticated_
investor.html. 
8  As an American Bar Association committee has pointed out, sophistication “is a shorthand way of 
expressing a rather complex thought.” Fed. Regulation of Sec. Comm., Am. Bar Ass’n, Section 4(2) and 
Statutory Law, 31 BUS. LAW. 485, 493 (1975). 
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only to such investors substantial relief from the rigors and costs of 1933 
Act registration.9 
Another area where sophistication proxies based on wealth and income 
appear is in the aforementioned sophisticated investor defense often 
deployed by broker-dealers in suitability cases.10 Despite its questionable 
legal sufficiency,11 defendants continue to deploy the defense because it is 
persuasive to arbitration panels.12 It is difficult to divorce discussion of the 
treatment of sophistication in statutory benchmarks from discussion of the 
treatment of sophistication in suitability cases. Accordingly, this Comment 
examines investor sophistication in each of these contexts. 
I am not the first to note contradictions in the sophistication proxies 
employed by federal securities laws. In 1988, six years after the SEC’s 
promulgation of Regulation D established sophistication proxies in the 1933 
Act,13 Professor C. Edward Fletcher wondered skeptically: 
[S]hould the law presume that wealthy investors, who can bear investment 
risks, are sophisticated investors, and treat them as such, no matter how 
financially naive they may be? Conversely, should the law treat poor, but 
financially sophisticated investors, who cannot bear investment risks, like 
other sophisticated investors? In short, what role should wealth and 
sophistication play in the determination whether an issuer must undertake 1933 
Act registration?14 
Commenting on the financial crisis of 2008, a Forbes columnist phrased 
this worry more boldly, mocking “a legal system that . . . says people who 
have or control a lot of money are automatically smarter than the little guy 
 
9  See infra Part I.A. On April 5, 2012, President Obama signed the Jumpstart Our Business Startups 
(JOBS) Act, which, although it did not alter the accredited investor standards, substantially relaxed the 
restrictions on general solicitations of investors in qualifying smaller offerings in the interest of making 
it easier for smaller companies to raise capital. See Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 
112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012). 
10  See infra Part II.B. 
11  As Melton notes, “Even though there is no legal basis for the defense, arbitrators seem to be 
swayed [by] it.” Melton, supra note 2, at 64. Similarly, attorney James J. Eccleston argues, “[I]n the 
context of a simple negligence action for recommending an unsuitable investment, the sophistication 
defense is not legitimate.” James J. Eccleston, The “Sophisticated” Investor Defense to Suitability 
Claims; More Frequently Raised than Proven, FINANCIALCOUNSEL.COM INVESTOR (2003), http://
investor.financialcounsel.com/Articles/Investment/ARTINV0000236-SophisticatedInvestor.pdf. 
12  See Melton, supra note 2, at 64; Pekarek & Obremski, supra note 7. 
13  Prior to the enactment of Regulation D, Rule 146, adopted in 1974, offered a safe harbor for 
private offerings that required: (1) all offerees be sophisticated or wealthy and (2) actual purchasers be 
sophisticated or consult a financial advisor. The path from Rule 146 to Regulation D can be described as 
a move from a conjunctive test where wealth and sophistication were both necessary for an exemption to 
a disjunctive test where one or the other will suffice. See C. Edward Fletcher, III, Sophisticated Investors 
Under the Federal Securities Laws, 1988 DUKE L.J. 1081, 1123 (“This entire scheme changed in 1982, 
when the SEC promulgated Regulation D . . . . The new Rule replaces the old Rule’s dual requirement 
of access and sophistication with a dual requirement of access and either sophistication or wealth.”). 
14  Id. at 1123–24. 
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and therefore don’t need as much protection. The last year proves this 
assumption false.”15 
Today, the debate continues. A January 2012 New York Times article 
phrased the problem as “Deciding Who’s Rich (or Smart) Enough for High-
Risk Investments.”16 On the occasion of the SEC’s announcement of a 
minor revision to Regulation D, the article quoted a Sullivan & Cromwell 
partner acknowledging that “[i]t’s an interesting question as to why 
[wealth] qualifies someone as sophisticated.”17 The article opined that 
“using money as a stand-in for financial sophistication is a fairly 
unsophisticated solution” and offered several alternative proposals that 
could make for more efficient approaches.18 
The debate has been energized by recent revelations of large public 
entities—treated as sophisticated by securities laws—losing staggering 
sums on very high-risk investments during the recent financial crisis. Two 
of the saddest stories concern a $200 million loss on collateralized debt 
obligations (CDOs) suffered by five cash-strapped Wisconsin school 
districts and a $650 million loss on interest-rate swaps by the recently 
bankrupted Jefferson County, Alabama.19 
Criticisms of wealth- and size-based sophistication proxies often lead 
commentators to three arguably contradictory arguments: (1) federal 
securities laws are overprotective of small investors and should be relaxed 
because they unfairly bar less wealthy investors from potentially lucrative 
opportunities,20 (2) federal securities laws are underprotective of large 
investors and should be strengthened,21 and (3) federal securities laws are 
 
15  John E. Girouard, The Sophisticated Investor Farce, FORBES.COM (Mar. 24, 2009, 12:30 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/2009/03/24/accredited-investor-sec-personal-finance-financial-advisor-network-
net-worth.html; see also Wulf A. Kaal, Hedge Fund Regulation via Basel III, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L 
L. 389, 436 (2011) (“[T]he general policy of qualifying investors by using wealth as a proxy for 
sophistication seems questionable.”). 
16  Paul Sullivan, Deciding Who’s Rich (or Smart) Enough for High-Risk Investments, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 14, 2012, at B5. 
17  Id. 
18  Id.; see infra Part IV.A; infra note 182. 
19  See infra Part III.C. 
20  See, e.g., Houman B. Shadab, Fending For Themselves: Creating a U.S. Hedge Fund Market for 
Retail Investors, 11 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 251, 319 (2008) (arguing that allowing retail 
investors easier access to less-regulated hedge fund investments “will not increase the risks to which 
they are already exposed” and “will . . . help [them] fend for themselves”). 
21  See, e.g., Howard M. Friedman, On Being Rich, Accredited, and Undiversified: The Lacunae in 
Contemporary Securities Regulation, 47 OKLA. L. REV. 291, 317 (1994) (“Few garner less sympathy in 
the ongoing public policy debate than do the wealthy. The obligation of the law, however, to do justice 
to the rich as well as to the poor suggests that sacrificing the accredited investor on the altar of small 
business capital formation is difficult to justify . . . .”). 
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both overprotective of small investors and underprotective of large 
investors and should be adjusted accordingly.22 
In addition to the criticisms that wealth and size inaccurately reflect 
actual sophistication, another reason to consider modifying the exemptions 
based on these factors is the ever-expanding number of complex investment 
products confronting investors. Nonetheless, legislators and regulators 
seemingly continue to adhere to the philosophy that if wealthy individuals 
and institutions have not proven more sophisticated, they can at least afford 
to hire intelligent advisors and are better able to tolerate investment losses. 
Regrettably, the latest SEC modification of Rule 215 and Regulation D23 
and a recent SEC staff study each reflect a continued adherence to the belief 
that the current benchmarks for investor wealth and size are adequate 
proxies for sophistication.24 
This Comment illustrates the dangers of continuing along this path 
without substantive modifications by offering a two-pronged argument: 
(1) wealth and size have at times proven poor proxies for investor 
sophistication and (2) given that large numbers of investment products are 
proving increasingly complex and hard to value, investor sophistication no 
longer affords the degree of protection it once did.25 Part I of this Comment 
 
22  See, e.g., Wallis K. Finger, Note, Unsophisticated Wealth: Reconsidering the SEC’s “Accredited 
Investor” Definition Under the 1933 Act, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 733, 754 (2009) (“[T]his bright-line 
standard is both under- and overinclusive.”). 
23  See infra Part I.B. 
24  The SEC staff study proposed “establishing a uniform fiduciary standard for investment advisers 
and broker-dealers when providing investment advice about securities to retail customers . . . consistent 
with the standard that currently applies to investment advisers.” SEC STAFF, STUDY ON INVESTMENT 
ADVISERS AND BROKER-DEALERS ii (2011) [hereinafter SECTION 913 STUDY], available at http://www.
sec.gov/news/studies/2011/913studyfinal.pdf. In focusing on “retail customers,” the study declined to 
recommend applying the standard to a broker-dealer’s interactions with institutional investors. Notably, 
the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd–Frank Act) provides the SEC 
with the power to expand investment adviser standards to broker-dealers for all customers, not just retail 
investors. § 913(f), Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1827 (2010). 
25  As Professor Helen Parry notes: 
[I]n recent years . . . [investors] are being tempted to venture into those sectors which carry more 
risk and leverage . . . . Such markets have proved to be very strange, volatile and frightening 
places even for relatively experienced investors, such as those who work for the treasury 
departments of major corporations or public sector agencies. 
Helen Parry, Hedge Funds, Hot Markets and the High Net Worth Investor: A Case for Greater 
Protection?, 21 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 703, 719 (2001); see also Wulf A. Kaal, Hedge Fund Valuation: 
Retailization, Regulation, and Investor Suitabilty, 28 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 581, 590–91 (2009) 
(“[T]he constant invention and production of new instruments and structures often make [investments] 
difficult to price. . . . Many of these hard-to-value assets, including collateralized debt 
obligations . . . and collateralized loan obligations . . . are so complex that accurate valuation may never 
be achieved . . . .”); Seller’s Remorse? Wall Street Rethinking Suitability of ‘Suitability,’ 
INVESTMENTNEWS (June 3, 2010, 7:45 AM), http://www.investmentnews.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?
AID=/20100603/FREE/100609969 [hereinafter Seller’s Remorse?] (“While the definition of 
sophisticated hasn’t changed in decades, Wall Street has been selling increasingly complex products, 
such as swaps, auction-rate securities and collateralized debt obligations . . . .”). 
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maps some of the areas of federal securities laws that rely on wealth- and 
size-based sophistication proxies. Part II examines the use of sophistication 
proxies in suitability cases and other litigation contexts. Part III offers three 
case studies of massive losses suffered by private and public institutional 
investors that illustrate the flawed assumptions of the current approach. Part 
IV offers a pair of proposals for modifying securities laws and regulations 
in an effort to beef up the protection of institutional investors. The first 
proposal encompasses an inflation- and diversification-sensitive approach 
to the numerical statutory benchmarks that represent sophistication, such as 
the Regulation D accredited investor standards. The second proposal 
concerns the treatment of investor sophistication by courts and arbitration 
panels, recommending a heightening of the standard of care26 imposed on 
broker-dealers equivalent to the fiduciary duty imposed on registered 
investment advisers (RIAs) under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 
(Advisers Act).27 
I. WEALTH AND SIZE AS SOPHISTICATION IN STATUTORY EXEMPTIONS 
FROM FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS 
The protection of credulous investors was the motivation behind the 
first federal securities laws passed in response to the abuses in financial 
markets of the 1920s that culminated in the crash of 1929.28 In some tension 
with this motivation, in recent decades, commentators have increasingly 
emphasized the goal of enabling companies to access capital efficiently in 
investment markets as the foundation of securities laws.29 Proponents of the 
capital formation rationale see fewer regulatory controls as a means of 
achieving this goal.30 While the emphasis on disclosure-based investor 
protection still forms the core regulatory principle, the influence of the 
capital formation rationale, a belief in market efficiency, and fears about 
 
26  Suitability rules define the standard of care for broker-dealers making investment 
recommendations to their customers. See infra Part II.B. 
27  15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to -21 (2006); SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 195 
(1963) (noting the Advisers Act codified the common law to prevent “fraudulent securities transactions 
by fiduciaries”). 
28  As Fletcher points out, the “legislative history [of the 1933 and 1934 Acts] shows that nearly 
every provision was motivated . . . by concerns with predation on individual investors.” Fletcher, supra 
note 13, at 1134. 
29  Beginning in the late 1970s, investor protection was redefined as “regulators strove to insure the 
economic efficiency of securities markets,” which entailed the “embrace” of the “goal of encouraging 
capital formation.” Friedman, supra note 21, at 291, 301; see also Roberta S. Karmel, Regulation by 
Exemption: The Changing Definition of an Accredited Investor, 39 RUTGERS L.J. 681, 681 n.1 (2008) 
(noting the genesis of Regulation D was concerns about small businesses’ access to capital). 
30  In 1978, the SEC held hearings to consider how the 1933 and 1934 Acts contributed to the 
problems faced by small companies seeking capital. The initial result was the adoption of Rule 242, a 
forerunner to Rule 505, permitting certain issuers to sell up to $2 million worth of “securities to an 
unlimited number of accredited investors plus 35 other” individuals. See Friedman, supra note 21, at 
303–04. 
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tight credit markets have increasingly pushed regulators to offer exemptions 
to the costs and burdens of disclosure.31 
Many exemptions turn on the personal wealth or institutional size of 
potential investors. A prime example is the introduction of Regulation D in 
1982. In response to concerns about the ability of businesses to access 
credit markets cheaply and efficiently, Regulation D exempted from 1933 
Act registration requirements certain qualified offerings to accredited 
investors with a net worth of $1 million or more.32 The remainder of Part I 
maps the current wealth- and size-based exemptions from securities laws, 
starting with Regulation D. Part II examines the use of similar 
sophistication proxies in suitability claims brought by disgruntled 
customers against broker-dealers. 
A. The Treatment of Wealth and Size as Sophistication in  
Regulation D and Rule 215 
As is the case with many areas of securities law, the state of play with 
respect to the statutory treatment of wealth, size, and sophistication is 
complex and resists easy summarization. The accredited investor definition 
in Regulation D and Rule 215 of the 1933 Act is the place commentators 
typically begin the discussion. One of many exemptions for wealthy 
investors in federal securities laws, Regulation D represents a nonexclusive, 
bright-line safe harbor for the § 4(2) exemption from the 1933 Act’s 
registration and prospectus delivery requirements for “transactions by an 
issuer not involving any public offering.”33 
Regulation D is responsible for much of the private placement market 
where large institutions and wealthy individuals make investments in 
financial products offered by issuers and underwriters who are not subject 
to the costs of registration or its mandatory disclosure requirements.34 
Additionally, Regulation D is the vehicle used by many hedge funds and 
private equity funds to raise capital from investors.35 
The accredited investor concept was first inserted into the 1933 Act by 
a 1980 amendment.36 This legislation was motivated by “Congressional 
concern that small businesses should have an adequate market to raise 
capital and that investors should not be unnecessarily impeded from 
 
31  See id. at 292–305. 
32  See infra Part I.A. 
33  15 U.S.C § 77d(2) (2006). 
34  See JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 281–87 (6th ed. 
2009). 
35  On hedge funds’ reliance on Regulation D, see id. at 286. On private equity funds’ reliance on 
Regulation D, see JACK S. LEVIN, STRUCTURING VENTURE CAPITAL, PRIVATE EQUITY, AND 
ENTREPRENEURIAL TRANSACTIONS ¶¶ 207.1–.3.8 (2011). 
36  See Karmel, supra note 29, at 681. 
107:285 (2012) Wealth and Size as Sophistication 
 293 
purchasing securities of small businesses.”37 In 1982, the SEC defined and 
deployed the term “accredited investor” in Rule 215 and Rule 501 of 
Regulation D.38 The definition includes enumerated large institutional 
investors such as financial institutions, pension funds, and corporations with 
assets exceeding $5 million.39 It also includes individuals or married 
couples whose net worth “at the time of the sale” exceeds $1 million or 
whose annual income in each of the past two years exceeds: (a) $200,000 
for individuals and (b) $300,000 for couples, coupled with a reasonable 
expectation of reaching the same income level in the current year.40 
Addressing concerns that the now-thirty-year-old numerical 
benchmarks in Regulation D are woefully behind the times, the Dodd–
Frank Act directed the SEC to amend the accredited investor definition for 
individuals and married couples to subtract the value of a principal 
residence from the net worth calculation.41 SEC Release No. 33-9287 
stipulated that the Commission will do just that, amending the language of 
Rule 215 and Rule 501 to subtract any positive equity in a primary 
residence from the investor’s net worth, while also excluding any negative 
equity within certain limits.42 
The implications of amending Rules 215 and 501 for issuances 
directed at investors who meet the accredited investor standard are 
somewhat complex. If an issuance involves offers or sales solely to 
accredited investors, provided the aggregate offering price does not exceed 
$5 million and certain other requirements are met, § 4(5) of the 1933 Act 
exempts these offerings from registration.43 For offerings pursuant to the 
Regulation D safe harbors of Rule 505 or Rule 506, an issuer need not 
comply with the information delivery requirements of Rule 502 if sales are 
solely to accredited investors and such sales do not count toward the thirty-
five-purchaser limit imposed on issuances under these safe harbors.44 
 
37  S. REP. NO. 96-958, at 45 (1980). 
38  The term is defined virtually identically in Rule 215 and in Rule 501(a) of Regulation D. 
17 C.F.R. §§ 230.215, 230.501(a) (2011). 
39  Id. § 230.501(a). 
40  Id. 
41  Dodd–Frank Act § 413(a), Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1577 (2010). 
42  Net Worth Standard for Accredited Investors, Securities Act Release No. 33-9287, Investment 
Company Act Release No. 29,891, 76 Fed. Reg. 81,793, 81,794 (Dec. 29, 2011). To prevent 
manipulation of the standard, indebtedness secured by a primary residence will be treated as a liability if 
“the borrowing occurs in the 60 days preceding the purchase of securities in the exempt offering and is 
not in connection with the acquisition of the primary residence.” Press Release, SEC, SEC Adopts Net 
Worth Standard for Accredited Investors Under Dodd–Frank Act (Dec. 21, 2011), available at http://
www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-274.htm. 
43  15 U.S.C.A. § 77d(a)(5) (2012). 
44  17 C.F.R. §§ 230.505(b)(2)(ii), 230.506(b)(2)(i). While Rule 505 offerings have a cap of $5 
million, Rule 506 offerings are unlimited. Id. § 230.505(b)(2)(i). 
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Importantly, selling an offering only to accredited investors also 
overrides the less bright-line investor sophistication requirement that Rule 
506 imposes on issuances sold to unaccredited investors. The Rule requires 
that each purchaser who is not an accredited investor must, alone or with a 
purchaser representative, have “such knowledge and experience in financial 
and business matters that he is capable of evaluating the merits and risks of 
the prospective investment.”45 While this use of a wealth-as-sophistication 
proxy undermines certain protections for wealthy investors in Rule 506 
offerings, accredited investors have the right to request the information that 
must be provided to unaccredited investors in Regulation D offerings.46 
The thinking here is twofold: (1) wealthy investors have a greater 
ability to “bear the economic risk” of investments,47 and (2) wealthy 
investors have a greater ability to “purchase” sophistication by hiring 
financial advisors. Further, the provision of Regulation D noting accredited 
investors have a right to request information mandatorily provided to 
unaccredited investors suggests confidence that wealthier investors are also 
protected by the greater bargaining power they wield with issuers and 
sellers. 
While there is merit to these arguments, it is hard to imagine the SEC 
believes the 1982 benchmarks of $1 million net worth for individuals and 
$5 million for institutions carry the same ability to purchase financial 
advice or wield bargaining power some thirty years later in 2012. Adjusting 
for inflation, $1 million in 1982 dollars has approximately the same buying 
power as $2.37 million does in 2012 dollars.48 For $5 million in 1982 
dollars, the equivalent amount in 2012 dollars is $11.87 million.49 Just to 
keep pace with inflation, the income benchmarks for individuals and 
couples would have to be increased from $200,000 to $474,827 and from 
$300,000 to $712,240, respectively. 
While it may be intuitively appealing, the idea that wealthy investors 
have a greater ability to bear economic risks associated with investing does 
not hold true if accredited investors are not prevented from investing their 
entire net worth in a transaction.50 An individual with $70 million in net 
worth or a company with $700 million in net assets can no more afford to 
lose all of their capital in a financial investment than can an individual with 
a $7000 net worth. Worries of this type could explain some of the 
 
45  Id. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii). 
46  Id. § 230.502(b)(2)(v). 
47  Net Worth Standard for Accredited Investors, 76 Fed. Reg. at 81,794. 
48  See CPI Inflation Calculator, BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., http://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_
calculator.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 2012) [hereinafter Inflation Calculator]. 
49  Id. 
50  A “100% of net worth investment” is always a possibility with respect to an uncapped Rule 506 
offering and could conceivably be possible with a Rule 505 offering if an accredited investor’s net worth 
is $5 million or less. 
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tremendous variation in the numerical benchmarks chosen to serve as 
sophistication proxies in securities and commodities laws over the last 
thirty years and the upward trend that the benchmarks have exhibited. Just 
as plausibly, worries about the erosional effects of inflation could be behind 
this upward trend, although inflation-pegged benchmarks would clearly be 
a more efficient way of handling such concerns. A brief survey of these 
ensuing exemptions follows. 
B. The Treatment of Wealth and Size as Sophistication in Rule 144A 
Adopted in 1990, the stated goal of Rule 144A is to achieve “a more 
liquid and efficient institutional resale market for unregistered securities.”51 
Similar to the Regulation D provisions for accredited investors investing in 
primary offerings, Rule 144A deems the resales of securities52 to “qualified 
institutional buyers” (QIBs) exempt from the registration and prospectus 
delivery requirements of the 1933 Act.53 QIBs are defined to include 
(1) large institutional investors such as pension plans, financial institutions, 
and investment companies that own and invest on a discretionary basis at 
least $100 million in securities of issuers with whom they are not affiliated; 
(2) registered broker-dealers that own and invest at least $10 million of 
such securities; and (3) qualifying banks that own and invest at least $100 
million of such securities and have a net worth of at least $25 million.54 
While the 1990 QIB benchmarks have not been subject to quite the 
same level of inflationary erosion as the 1982 vintage Regulation D 
benchmarks, there has been a substantial impact here as well. The buying 
power equivalent of $100 million in 1990 dollars is approximately $175 
million in 2012 dollars.55 Twenty-five million dollars in 1990 dollars is 
equivalent to approximately $43.82 million in 2012 dollars.56 As with the 
Regulation D benchmarks, the QIB benchmarks have never been adjusted 
for inflation, and there is no percentage cap on the amount of net worth that 
a QIB can invest in a Rule 144A offering. Although the use of Rule 144A 
was initially modest, by 2006 the amount of debt and equity raised under 
this exemption in sales to QIBs exceeded $1 trillion.57 
 
51  Resale of Restricted Securities; Changes to Method of Determining Holding Period of Restricted 
Securities Under Rules 144 and 145, Securities Act Release Nos. 33-6862, 34-27928, 55 Fed. Reg. 
17,933, 17,934 (Apr. 30, 1990). 
52  Under securities laws, there are two primary types of transactions. A “sale” refers to an initial 
sale of securities by an issuer to raise capital from investors. A “resale” connotes a secondary transaction 
where a holder of securities sells into a trading market for liquidity purposes. 
53  17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (2011). 
54  Id. § 230.144A(a)(1). 
55  See Inflation Calculator, supra note 48. 
56  Id. 
57  Karmel, supra note 29, at 689. 
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C. Wealth and Size as Sophistication in the Investment Company  
Act of 1940 
Similar to the impetus behind the 1933 and 1934 Acts, the motivation 
behind the Investment Company Act of 1940 (1940 Act) was to increase the 
protection of credulous would-be investors by subjecting investment 
companies to additional SEC oversight.58 The statute stipulates that mutual 
funds and other issuers engaged in the business of buying and selling 
securities must register with the SEC while also subjecting them to a variety 
of reporting, recordkeeping, and exam requirements as well as certain 
investment restrictions.59 There are two principal statutory exemptions to 
the burden of registration, § 3(c)(1) and § 3(c)(7),60 the latter of which 
employs wealth-based benchmarks as a sophistication proxy. 
In response to worries that the § 3(c)(1) exemption for investment 
companies with 100 U.S. investors or less was overly restrictive, the SEC in 
1992 proposed an exemption for companies that sold solely securities only 
to “qualified purchasers” considered sufficiently sophisticated based on 
wealth or size to not require statutory protection.61 In 1997, the resulting 
§ 3(c)(7) exemption went into effect, exempting investment companies with 
securities owned solely by qualified purchasers from disclosure and 
reporting requirements if they refrained from public offerings.62 The 
definition of qualified purchasers includes (1) investors who own at least $5 
million in investments and (2) institutions that own and invest at least $25 
million63 on a discretionary basis.64 
As with Regulation D, Rule 215, and Rule 144A, the 1997 benchmarks 
for qualified purchasers under the 1940 Act have never been adjusted for 
inflation. In addition, the § 3(c)(7) exemption does not limit investments to 
some percentage of net worth less than 100%, undermining arguments that 
the exemption is warranted by wealthy investors’ increased ability to bear 
economic risk. Although the inflationary erosion of the dollar values is less 
dramatic here because § 3(c)(7) was enacted in 1997, the $5 and $25 
 
58  See Evan M. Gilbert, Unnecessary Reform: The Fallacies with and Alternative to SEC Regulation 
of Hedge Funds, 2 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 319, 326 (2009). 
59  See Vijay Sekhon, Can the Rich Fend for Themselves?: Inconsistent Treatment of Wealthy 
Investors Under the Private Fund Investment Advisers Registration Act of 2010, 7 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 
1, 3 (2011). 
60  15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(1), (7) (2006). 
61  See Parry, supra note 25, at 704. 
62  § 80a-3(c)(7). 
63  The wide variation in the dollar values chosen to connote investor sophistication in statutes and 
regulations suggests lawmakers and regulators have continually grappled with how to quantify this 
concept. 
64  § 80a-2(a)(51). Qualified purchasers under the 1940 Act are also “qualified eligible persons” for 
purposes of the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA). 17 C.F.R. § 4.7(a)(2)(vi) (2011). Enacted in 2006, 
this regulation exempts commodity pools involving only qualified eligible participants from various 
registration, recordkeeping, and disclosure requirements imposed by the CEA. Id. 
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million benchmarks for qualified individuals and institutions would have to 
be increased to $7.14 million and $35.69 million respectively to equal the 
buying power of the 1997 benchmarks in 2012 dollars.65 
II. JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF WEALTH AND SIZE AS SOPHISTICATION 
A. Early Judicial Treatment of Wealth and Size as Sophistication 
Prior to the promulgation of Regulation D as a safe harbor for 
nonpublic offerings, there was extensive treatment of investor 
sophistication in case law addressing whether an offering qualified for the 
private offering exemption of § 4(2) of the 1933 Act. The Supreme Court 
first addressed the issue in the 1953 Ralston Purina decision.66 In this 
seminal opinion, the Court shifted the focus of the analysis from the total 
number of offerees to whether offerees were “able to fend for themselves.”67 
An offering that meets this criteria is a transaction that does not “involv[e] 
any public offering.”68 While important harbingers of the regulatory trend, 
in the wake of the Regulation D safe harbor for private offerings, Ralston 
Purina and the associated line of cases has been rendered somewhat 
irrelevant. 
Rendered similarly irrelevant by the Rule 144A safe harbor for resales, 
the case law on the relevance of sophistication in determining whether a 
company insider can resell an issuer’s securities without registration 
evinces some interesting contradictions. In Ackerberg v. Johnson, the 
Eighth Circuit dismissed a plaintiff’s 1933 Act claims on investor 
sophistication grounds where the plaintiff had a net worth in excess of $1 
million, an annual income of $200,000, and a trading account with assets of 
$500,000.69 In contrast, a district court in the Ninth Circuit refused to grant 
a defendant’s motion for summary judgment on investor sophistication 
grounds despite the fact that one investor was the founding director of a 
trust company and another had made equity investments of greater than 
$50,000 and was the ex-CEO of a company being acquired in connection 
with the resale.70 
 
65  See Inflation Calculator, supra note 48. 
66  SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953). 
67  Id. at 125. 
68  Id. 
69  892 F.2d 1328, 1330, 1337 (8th Cir. 1989). 
70  Hedden v. Marinelli, 796 F. Supp. 432, 437–38 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (“Defendants have introduced 
substantial evidence to support the conclusion that Plaintiffs are sophisticated investors . . . . Despite this 
evidence, . . . this court cannot conclude that these individuals were sufficiently sophisticated to not 
require the protections of the 1933 Act.”). 
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Although largely moot, this contradictory case law suggests how 
difficult it is to quantify the concept of sophistication.71 In discussing some 
of the inconsistencies, commentators have raised additional criticisms about 
the overreliance on investor sophistication in securities regulation. One 
such criticism points out that “even sophisticated investors may not be able 
to protect their own interests if they do not have the information they need 
or want about the issuer or cannot feasibly understand it.”72 Another critique 
notes the paradox of a “scheme requir[ing] registration of securities offered 
to unsophisticated investors,” thereby ensuring that people who do not read 
prospectuses receive them, while not requiring they be provided to 
“sophisticated investors who would read and benefit from prospectuses if 
they received them.”73 Finally, an ABA committee and a noted treatise have 
each pointed out that courts tend to take a “polar approach[]” to investor 
sophistication,74 labeling offerees as either sophisticated or unsophisticated 
when, in reality, “it [is] important to recognize that there are degrees of 
sophistication.”75 
B. The Treatment of Wealth and Size as Sophistication in Suitability Cases 
Suitability cases are a still-relevant context where the issue of investor 
sophistication has been substantively addressed by courts and arbitration 
panels. A suitability case is essentially a negligence claim in which a 
customer alleges that a broker-dealer failed to disclose that a recommended 
financial product was “too risky to be suitable” for the plaintiff’s account.76 
It is generally true that a sophisticated plaintiff will lose a suitability action 
against a broker.77 In one such case, subsequently upheld by the Ninth 
 
71  Similar contradictions exist in the Ralston Purina line of cases. For example, Fifth Circuit case 
law throughout the 1970s downplayed the importance of sophistication in the inquiry as to the public or 
private nature of an offering. See, e.g., Doran v. Petroleum Mgmt. Corp., 545 F.2d 893, 901–03 (5th Cir. 
1977) (concluding that “[s]ophistication is not a substitute for” the information disclosed in a 
registration statement because without access to such information, a sophisticated investor’s 
sophistication is unhelpful); Hill York Corp. v. Am. Int’l Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d 680, 690 (5th Cir. 
1971) (rejecting the argument that sophistication of investors is dispositive). Conversely, in 1980, the 
Ninth Circuit labeled investor sophistication one of four factors in a multifactor test to determine 
whether an offering is public or private. SEC v. Murphy, 626 F.2d 633, 644–45 (9th Cir. 1980). In 1985, 
the Tenth Circuit indicated offeree sophistication is a relevant but nonessential condition for a private 
offering. Cowles v. Dow Keith Oil & Gas, Inc., 752 F.2d 508, 512 (10th Cir. 1985). 
72  Troy A. Paredes, On the Decision to Regulate Hedge Funds: The SEC’s Regulatory Philosophy, 
Style, and Mission, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 975, 992. 
73  Fletcher, supra note 13, at 1125–26. 
74  COX ET AL., supra note 34, at 277. 
75  Federal Regulation of Securities Comm., supra note 8, at 492. 
76  COX ET AL., supra note 34, at 278. 
77  See Lyle Roberts, Suitability Claims Under Rule 10b-5: Are Public Entities Sophisticated Enough 
to Use Derivatives?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 801, 803 (1996) (“Although courts have been reluctant to 
recognize suitability claims brought by sophisticated investors, the complex nature of derivatives has 
prompted calls for expanding the suitability doctrine to protect institutional investors who do not 
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Circuit, a plaintiff was found to be sophisticated in light of his bachelor’s 
degree in economics, his ability to understand financial reports, and his 
regular reading of investment advisory literature.78 In a contrasting case that 
may function as an implicit critique of an overreliance on statutory wealth-
as-sophistication proxies, an ex-housekeeper who inherited $500,000 in 
assets from a former employer she married was found to be 
unsophisticated.79 
There are two problems regarding the use of the investor sophistication 
defense in the suitability cases. First, as many practitioners have noted, the 
sophisticated investor defense is essentially a means of eviscerating the 
suitability rules promulgated by self-regulatory organizations (SROs) and 
replacing them with the largely discredited laissez-faire doctrine of caveat 
emptor.80 Second, courts in such cases “apparently see no relationship 
between these cases and other . . . cases involving sophisticated investors,” 
nor do they “articulate any coherent theory to justify such different 
treatment of sophisticated and unsophisticated customers.”81 
The success of the investor sophistication defense in suitability cases 
and arbitrations82 may have the perverse effect of making it more likely 
investors with small losses will prevail in disputes than investors with large 
losses deemed sophisticated enough to require less protection. This appears 
somewhat counterintuitive given that the temptation may be greater for 
brokers to recommend unsuitable investments to large customers given the 
fee-driven business model where brokers realize greater revenues on larger 
orders.83 
C. Implications for Large Investors 
Although suitability cases typically end up in arbitration,84 judicial 
decisions in an analogous context suggest something of the difficulty large 
institutions face in recovering on claims involving complex financial 
 
understand the risks of their investments.” (footnote omitted)); see also Fletcher, supra note 13, at 1108 
(“In cases involving sophisticated customers, courts are more likely to hold that no fiduciary relationship 
exists at all or that a broker’s fiduciary duty is easily met.” (footnote omitted)). 
78  Follansbee v. Davis, Skaggs & Co., 681 F.2d 673, 677, 678 (9th Cir. 1982). 
79  Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417, 423, 433 (N.D. Cal. 1968), aff’d, 430 F.2d 
1202 (9th Cir. 1970). 
80  See Melton, supra note 2, at 67. 
81  Fletcher, supra note 13, at 1109. 
82  See Pekarek & Obremski, supra note 7 (“[T]he sophisticated investor defense is frequently used 
against various securities arbitration claims . . . .”). 
83  As attorney-banker James White explains, “The risks of [the] ‘latest new things’ are compounded 
by a compensation system that pays people for innovation before the innovation is proven and without 
providing for individual penalties if it does not.” James H. White, III, Financing Plans for the Jefferson 
County Sewer System: Issues and Mistakes, 40 CUMB. L. REV. 717, 743 (2010). 
84  See Eccleston, supra note 11 (noting that, in general, “securities arbitration [is] where investors 
seek to recover their investment losses”). 
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products. In 2010, J.P. Morgan Chase was granted summary judgment and 
awarded fees in a breach of contract claim by Controladora Comercial 
Mexicana (CCM), Mexico’s largest retail conglomerate, stemming from the 
conglomerate’s nearly $500 million loss on interest-rate and foreign-
exchange derivatives, two notoriously complex investments.85 Also in 2010, 
a district court in the Second Circuit dismissed fraud, negligence, and 
breach of fiduciary duty claims by the San Diego County Employees 
Retirement Association (SDCERA), a pension fund, against Amaranth, a 
hedge fund that collapsed after squandering $6 billion in value on natural 
gas futures and losing $150 million of SDCERA’s $175 million 
investment.86 In dismissing SDCERA’s claims, Judge Deborah Batts 
observed that the pension fund “is a sophisticated investor,” pointing to 
their hiring of an investment advisor as ample evidence of this.87 
There is validity to the notion that large investors with knowledge, 
experience, and bargaining power need less judicial protection than smaller 
parties, especially in bilaterally negotiated transactions.88 However, it seems 
unwise from a policy standpoint to suggest to broker-dealers that they are 
less likely to face liability exposure where customer losses are larger, 
thereby incentivizing abusive practices in situations with greater damage 
potential. It is also important to remember that the industry standard 
contracts governing such transactions contain mandatory arbitration clauses 
that keep the vast majority of these disputes out of court.89 To the extent 
arbitrators are “captured” by the financial services industry that pays their 
compensation,90 there may be an even more urgent need to rethink the 
 
85  See J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Controladora Comercial Mexicana S.A.B. de C.V., No. 
603215/08, 2010 WL 4868142, at *1–4, *17 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 16, 2010) (noting CCM had been 
entering into interest-rate hedges with J.P. Morgan and others since the 1990s and did well on a number 
of these transactions prior to October 2008). 
86  San Diego Cnty. Emps. Ret. Ass’n v. Maounis, 749 F. Supp. 2d 104, 127, 129 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
87  Id. at 120. 
88  See, e.g., Andrea Doneff, Arbitration Clauses in Contracts of Adhesion Trap “Sophisticated 
Parties” Too, 2010 J. DISP. RESOL. 235, 236 (noting that courts, upon determining both parties are 
sophisticated, will typically uphold arbitration clauses). 
89  See Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1631, 
1639–40 (2005) (noting the spread of mandatory arbitration clauses popularized by the securities 
industry to a variety of other industries). 
90  As attorney Roger Perlstadt notes, “The New York Stock Exchange arbitration system has been 
accused of being dominated by the securities industry.” Roger J. Perlstadt, Timing of Institutional Bias 
Challenges to Arbitration, 69 U. CHI. L. REV 1983, 1987 (2002); see also Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, 
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 995 F. Supp. 190, 210 (D. Mass. 1998), aff’d, 170 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1999) 
(noting that the securities industry’s arbitration rules “have established an entire arbitral structure 
dominated by the industry”); Melton, supra note 2, at 64 (wondering if arbitrators’ receptiveness to the 
sophisticated investor defense when there is no basis for it “is due to industry bias”). 
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deference given to the sophisticated investor defense in negligence claims 
stemming from unsuitable investment recommendations.91 
Further developing the argument that imprecise sophistication proxies 
have led to the underprotection of large investors, Part III discusses three 
case studies involving massive investment losses suffered by institutional 
investors who purchased highly complex investment products. Following 
these case studies, Part IV offers a two-part proposal to address some of the 
policy dilemmas in this area. 
III. THREE CASE STUDIES SUGGESTING WEALTH AND SIZE ARE POOR 
PROXIES FOR SOPHISTICATION 
It is no doubt true that “[r]egulators generally do not spend sleepless 
nights worrying about the plight of millionaires who invest 
unsuccessfully.”92 While we might not lose any sleep over the plight of a 
large bank,93 there are also many cases of large public entities losing 
massive sums on investments with risks they plainly did not understand, 
including an investment fund for five Wisconsin school districts, a fund for 
Jefferson County, Alabama, and a fund for various public entities in Orange 
County, California. Looking at these large public entities as the aggregation 
of “little guys” that they are, the wisdom of securities laws that radically 
minimize investor protection based on a customer’s size or wealth seems 
questionable. 
Prior to discussing the recent losses suffered by the Wisconsin school 
districts and Jefferson County, this Part first examines two case studies in 
which a mix of private and public entities misunderstood the risks of 
complex investment products and suffered massive losses as a result. The 
first case study dates back to the mid-1990s, when a lack of comprehension 
of the risk of leveraged derivatives94 proved very costly to Proctor & 
Gamble (P&G), several other large companies, and Orange County. The 
second case study involves the SEC’s now-settled suit against Goldman 
Sachs for arranging a series of transactions that found two large European 
banks on the losing end of a bet made by a hedge fund against the housing 
market shortly before housing prices collapsed.95 
 
91  Investors who seek to appeal adverse arbitration decisions face a daunting task in district courts 
where the standard of review is one of abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Am. Postal Workers Union, AFL-
CIO v. U.S. Postal Serv., 362 F. Supp. 2d 284, 288 (D.D.C. 2005) (“The standard of review for 
arbitration decisions is abuse of discretion.”). 
92  Parry, supra note 25, at 718. 
93  See infra Part III.B. 
94  While a derivative is simply a side bet on the movement in value of some underlying asset, 
“[l]everaged derivatives are a particularly complex type of derivative, and their value can fluctuate to an 
even greater degree than . . . plain-vanilla derivatives.” Kelley Holland & Linda Himelstein, The 
Bankers Trust Tapes, BUS. WK., Oct. 16, 1995, at 106, 110. 
95  See SEC Enforcement Actions: Addressing Misconduct that Led To or Arose From the Financial 
Crisis, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/enf-actions-fc.shtml (last visited Nov. 11, 2012). 
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A. The Derivatives Woes of 1990s Corporate America 
[T]he risks involved [with derivatives] may not be properly understood 
even by the most sophisticated investors, and I am supposed to be one. 
—George Soros, testifying in front of Congress in April 199496 
In 1994, numerous institutions with extensive investing experience, 
including major corporations like P&G and Gibson Greetings, suffered 
massive losses on interest-rate vehicles known as swaps, which likely 
triggered realizations akin to the sentiment expressed by Soros, the 
legendary hedge fund manager.97 By any metric, in 1994, P&G was a large, 
sophisticated investor.98 The same can be said of Gibson Greetings, Air 
Products and Chemicals, Inc., the Federal Paper Board Co., and Jefferson 
Smurfit Corp.99 All of these companies were burned by “the investment 
craze of the 1990s”100 when they were seduced into placing costly bets on 
complex interest-rate swaps derivatives arranged by Bankers Trust (BT), a 
leader in the marketing of innovative financial products.101 P&G suffered 
the largest loss, a reported $157 million, in the liquidation of its trades with 
BT, one of the largest trading losses ever sustained by an American 
company at the time.102 
During this period, another large institutional investor, Orange County, 
California, lost an even greater sum of approximately $1.6 billion on 
interest-rate derivatives in a series of transactions arranged by Merrill 
 
96  Risks that Hedge Funds Pose to the Banking System: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Banking, 
Fin. & Urban Affairs, 103d Cong. 38 (1994) (testimony of George Soros). 
97  Like P&G, Soros suffered significant losses on interest-rate vehicles when the Federal Reserve 
Board unexpectedly raised short-term interest rates in February 1994. See Lawrence Malkin, Procter & 
Gamble’s Tale of Derivatives Woe, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Apr. 14, 1994, at 9. 
98  As of 1994, P&G was a $30-billion company. See id. 
99  In 1993, Gibson Greetings had sales of $547 million and profits of $20 million. Carol J. Loomis, 
Untangling the Derivatives Mess, FORTUNE, Mar. 20, 1995, at 50, 54. For the fiscal year that ended 
September 30, 1994, Air Products and Chemicals, Inc. had sales of $3.5 billion. Air Prods. & Chems., 
Inc., Annual Report for the Fiscal Year Ended Sept. 30, 1994 (Form 10-K), File No. 001-04534, 
available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/2969/0000950123-94-002010.txt. In 1993, 
Jefferson Smurfit Corp. had net sales of $2.95 billion. Jefferson Smurfit Corp., Annual Report for the 
Fiscal Year Ended Dec. 31, 1993 (Form 10-K), File No. 000-11951, available at http://www.sec.gov/
Archives/edgar/data/727742/0000727742-94-000001.txt. In 1994, the Federal Paper Board Company 
had sales of $1.57 billion. Kenneth N. Gilpin, International Paper Plans to Buy Federal Paper Board, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1995, at D4. 
100  Jennifer A. Frederick, Note, Not Just for Widows & Orphans Anymore: The Inadequacy of the 
Current Suitability Rules for the Derivatives Market, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 97, 100 (1995). 
101  See SUNGARD BANCWARE ERISK, BANKERS TRUST: AN ERISK.COM CASE STUDY 1, available 
at http://www.prmia.org/pdf/Case_Studies/Bankers_Trust.pdf. 
102  Gabriella Stern & Steven Lipin, Procter & Gamble to Take a Charge to Close Out Two Interest-
Rate Swaps, WALL ST. J., Apr. 13, 1994, at A3. P&G was forced to take a $102 million after-tax charge 
on their financial statements in the third quarter of 1994. See Malkin, supra note 97. 
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Lynch that helped push the county into bankruptcy in 1994.103 An 
investment pool, run by the Orange County treasurer for 200 local school 
districts, municipalities, and other public agencies, suffered the losses.104 
Merrill Lynch eventually settled a lawsuit with Orange County for $400 
million.105 
As a closer examination of these transactions suggests, each of these 
entities placed sizable bets on investment products with risks they 
seemingly did not understand despite their size and investing experience. 
The P&G deal structure is the most eye-opening example in this respect. In 
the early 1990s, P&G had a much-admired reputation for managing its debt 
costs, thanks to a series of deals swapping fixed-rate vehicles for floating-
rate vehicles that proved to be profitable bets on a continuing decline in 
interest rates.106 In October 1993, expecting interest rates to keep falling, 
P&G approached BT to discuss other products that could help them take 
advantage of interest-rate movements.107 By November, P&G had agreed to 
buy a leveraged derivative product from BT for $200 million, twice what 
they initially planned to spend.108 
It is important to note that leveraged derivatives are open to greater 
fluctuations than plain-vanilla derivatives109 and have much greater 
downside potential.110 In P&G’s case, they put up $200 million to purchase 
a complex swap that would prove profitable if interest rates stayed within a 
certain range.111 The potential upside of the transaction was shaving an 
estimated 0.3% off the company’s annual interest bill for a total savings of 
$1.5 million a year,112 a miniscule amount that illustrates how little P&G 
understood what it bought from BT. 
Even after the Federal Reserve Board’s February 1994 announcement 
that it would raise short-term rates for the first time in five years, P&G 
continued to put money on the table with BT, essentially doubling down on 
a “wedding band” swap in hopes that rates would swing in its favor.113 
According to reports, P&G did not realize how dire the situation was until 
 
103  See Andrew Pollack & Leslie Wayne, Ending Suit, Merrill Lynch to Pay California County $400 
Million, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 1998, at A1. 
104  Id. 
105  Id. The derivatives purchased by the Orange County investment pool were a more direct bet on 
the interest-rate trend line than the products sold by BT to corporate investors. See Hal S. Scott, Liability 
of Derivatives Dealers, in THE FUTURE FOR THE GLOBAL SECURITIES MARKET: LEGAL AND 
REGULATORY ASPECTS 271, 271 (Fidelis Oditah ed., 1996). 
106  See Loomis, supra note 99, at 62. 
107  Id. 
108  Id. at 64. 
109  See supra note 94. 
110  See Loomis, supra note 99, at 68. 
111  Id. at 54, 64. 
112  Id. at 64. 
113  Id. 
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March 1994 when the company shifted into damage control mode in its 
dealings with BT.114 
In a series of settlements, BT wrote off some $423 million in customer 
losses on interest-rate swaps,115 spurred in part by the existence of audio 
tapes on which BT employees could be heard gloating about how little their 
customers understood the risks of such transactions.116 As for P&G, its CEO 
publicly pledged that the company had learned its lesson on the dangers of 
derivatives.117 Despite such promises, in the ensuing years, institutional 
investors have had great difficulty resisting the riskiest “latest new 
things”118 cooked up by financial products innovators like BT. The next case 
study offers evidence of this. 
B. Doing God’s Work119 
“[T]he whole building is about to collapse . . . . Only potential 
survivor, the fabulous Fab . . . standing in the middle of all these 
complex, highly leveraged, exotic trades he created without necessarily 
understanding all of the implications of those monstruosities [sic]!!!” 
—Fabrice “Fab” Tourre, the Goldman Sachs salesman at the center  
of the ABACUS deal, in an e-mail to a friend in January 2007120 
The investment craze of the 2000s was the CDO.121 In a CDO 
transaction brokered by Tourre, IKB Deutsche Industriebank (IKB), a 
 
114  See id. 
115  Id. at 66. BT settled with most of its institutional purchasers who suffered losses on derivatives, 
including P&G, Gibson Greetings, Air Products and Chemicals, Inc., and the Federal Paper Board 
Company. See SUNGARD BANCWARE ERISK, supra note 101, at 1. 
116  At a videotaped training session for new employees, explaining a hypothetical derivative 
transaction among Sony, IBM, and BT, a BT employee explained, “[W]hat Bankers Trust can do for 
Sony and IBM is get in the middle and rip them off . . . . Let me take that back. I just realized that I’m 
being filmed.” Holland & Himelstein, supra note 94, at 108. 
117  In 1994, P&G CEO and Chairman Edwin Artzt remarked, “Derivatives like these are dangerous, 
and we were badly burned . . . . We won’t let this happen again.” P&G Reports $102-Million 
Derivatives Loss, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 13, 1994, at D2. 
118  White, supra note 83, at 743. 
119  In an unfortunate bit of timing, just prior to the dissemination of revelations about the ABACUS 
deal, Goldman Sachs managing partner Lloyd Blankfein was quoted praising the firm’s investment 
bankers for “doing God’s work.” See John Arlidge & Philip Beresford, Inside the Goldmine, SUNDAY 
TIMES, Nov. 8, 2009, at 12, 24. 
120  Gregory Zuckerman et al., U.S. Charges Goldman Sachs with Fraud, WALL ST. J., Apr. 17–18, 
2010, at A1. 
121  A CDO is a security whose value and payments are derived from a portfolio of underlying fixed-
income assets. The ABACUS transaction involved: (1) so-called synthetic CDOs (which do not own the 
underlying assets in contrast to traditional CDOs); (2) credit default swaps (CDSs) which, much like an 
insurance policy, can be used by bond owners to hedge the risk of default (or to speculate on the 
creditworthiness of entities without purchasing or selling their bonds); and (3) residential mortgage-
backed securities (RMBS) (bonds backed by pools of residential real estate mortgages). See Philip 
Whalen & Kara Tan Bhala, Goldman Sachs and the ABACUS Deal, SEVEN PILLARS INST. FOR GLOBAL 
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German bank, and ABN Amro, a Dutch bank, lost a combined $1 billion on 
an ill-timed bet on the home loan market just prior to a dramatic reversal in 
housing prices reminiscent of the interest-rate reversal that proved costly to 
companies like P&G in 1994.122 The transactions involved derivatives tied 
to risky subprime residential mortgage loans.123 While ABN Amro 
ultimately lost more money than IKB,124 much of the criticism of Goldman 
Sachs concerned their dealings with IKB and ACA Management (ACA), 
another sophisticated player chosen as the deal’s portfolio selection agent 
that also suffered a large loss.125 
Since 2007, IKB had been purchasing CDOs backed by prime and 
subprime mortgages.126 Like many other large institutional investors, they 
came to Goldman Sachs seeking objective advice on these investments.127 
According to reports, by late 2006, IKB told Goldman Sachs it was “no 
longer comfortable investing” in such products if they had not been vetted 
by an independent third party or if the trades did not involve a collateral 
manager.128 
Around this time, John Paulson, manager of the New York-based 
hedge fund Paulson & Co., approached Goldman Sachs asking it to 
assemble a CDO, later dubbed ABACUS 2007–AC1, which he could use to 
short the housing market, proposing a deal that would net Goldman Sachs a 
$15 million fee.129 Attempting to satisfy both customers, Tourre and 
Goldman Sachs responded to IKB’s skepticism about the proposed Abacus 
deal by selecting ACA as a collateral manager.130 Crucially, the marketing 
materials for ABACUS failed to disclose that despite ACA’s participation, 
the selection process was principally done by Paulson & Co., with the 
hedge fund stacking the deck in its favor.131 The SEC later contended that 
 
FIN. & ETHICS, http://sevenpillarsinstitute.org/case-studies/goldman-sachs-and-the-abacus-deal (last 
visited Nov. 12, 2012). 
122  See Marc Pitzke, Wall Street vs. Washington: Goldman Sachs Goes on the Offensive, SPIEGEL 
ONLINE (Apr. 22, 2010, 3:19 PM), http://www.spiegel.de/international/business/0,1518,690527,00.html. 
123  See Whalen & Bhala, supra note 121. 
124  See supra note 122. 
125  As a result of the ABACUS fallout, ACA’s parent company failed in late 2007. See Whalen & 
Bhala, supra note 121. 
126  See Zachary A. Goldfarb, SEC Confident on IKB Part of Goldman Suit, WASH. POST, Apr. 24, 
2010, at A8. 
127  See id. 
128  Gregory Corcoran, SEC v. Goldman: Meet One Abacus Investor, WALL ST. J. DEAL J. (Apr. 16, 
2010, 12:26 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2010/04/16/sec-v-goldman-meet-one-abacus-investor/. 
129  See Whalen & Bhala, supra note 121. 
130  See Pitzke, supra note 122. 
131  See Andrew Ross Sorkin, When Deals on Wall Street Resemble a Casino Wager, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 20, 2010, at B1. 
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this omission and other misstatements by Goldman Sachs defrauded 
investors, including IKB and ABN Amro.132 
From February to April of 2007, Goldman Sachs marketed ABACUS 
to its customers.133 In April, IKB invested $150 million in the deal. Nine 
months later, the collapse of the housing market meant IKB’s investment 
was essentially worthless,134 as was the $841 million investment of ABN 
Amro.135 In contrast to the large losses of IKB, ABN Amro, and ACA,136 
Paulson & Co. netted approximately $1 billion.137 The tally that best 
underlines the difficulty even the most sophisticated institutions have 
evaluating the risks of innovative products was Goldman Sachs’s loss of 
more than $100 million, wiping out their $15 million fee, despite their 
knowledge of John Paulson’s pessimism about the housing market.138 
The legal fallout was a settlement with the SEC whereby Goldman 
Sachs agreed to pay a penalty of $550 million and issued a statement that 
did not admit wrongdoing but acknowledged its marketing materials 
“contained incomplete information.”139 In the end, $150 million of the SEC 
settlement went to IKB and $100 million went to Royal Bank of Scotland, 
which purchased ABN Amro.140 The business fallout was a costly twelve-
billion-euro bailout of IKB by Germany141 and IKB’s subsequent sale to a 
private equity firm in 2009.142 
C. Trouble in Milwaukee and Jefferson County 
In a deal more troubling than the ABACUS debacle in its implications 
with respect to sophistication proxies, five Wisconsin school districts lost 
 
132  See Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges Goldman Sachs with Fraud in Structuring and Marketing 
of CDO Tied to Subprime Mortgages (Apr. 16, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/
2010-59.htm. Evidence emerged to contradict the SEC’s claim that ACA had been defrauded. Goldfarb, 
supra note 126 (noting that reports that a Paulson & Co. deputy had informed ACA that the fund 
intended to short the securities “rais[ed] serious questions about whether ACA was misled or 
defrauded”). 
133  See Corcoran, supra note 128. 
134  See id. 
135  See Pitzke, supra note 122. 
136  Estimates of the loss suffered by ACA are as high as $900 million. See Whalen & Bhala, supra 
note 121. 
137  See id. 
138  See Pitzke, supra note 122. 
139  DealBook, Goldman Settles with S.E.C. for $550 Million, DEALB%K (July 15, 2010, 4:17 PM), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/07/15/goldman-to-settle-with-s-e-c-for-550-million. 
140  See Goldman’s Deep Pockets May Still Attract Lawsuits, REUTERS (July 16, 2010, 3:44 PM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/07/16/goldman-rbs-idCNLDE66F0TD20100716?rpc=44. 
141  See Karin Matussek, Ex-IKB CEO Convicted of Misleading Investors About Bank’s Subprime 
Risks, BLOOMBERG (July 14, 2010, 6:09 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-07-14/ex-ikb-
chief-ortseifen-convicted-of-market-manipulation-over-subprime.html. 
142  See Pitzke, supra note 122. IKB’s CEO was given a ten-month suspended sentence for 
misstating company assets. See Matussek, supra note 141. 
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$200 million in pooled funds invested in a trust set up to finance $400 
million in unfunded pension and health care liabilities.143 The schools’ 
investment trust was set up by David Noack, a senior vice president in the 
Milwaukee office of investment bank Stifel Financial (Stifel).144 From June 
to December 2006, Noack invested the schools’ funds in notes linked to 
highly leveraged synthetic CDOs sold by RBC Capital Markets LLC 
(RBC).145 The deal involved an arbitrage strategy where the schools would 
borrow money and invest it in AA-minus-rated corporate debt that would 
yield more than the schools would pay in interest on the loans.146 An 
additional layer of complexity was added when the lending bank, Depfa, of 
Ireland, requested that the securities be structured as CDOs.147 As in the 
ABACUS transaction, ACA acted as a portfolio selection agent for RBC, 
along with UBS.148 
Noack reportedly assured his clients that it would take “15 Enrons” to 
put their capital in jeopardy and that the CDOs were as safe as U.S. 
Treasuries.149 Such statements suggest either an audacious level of 
mendacity or, more likely, how little Noack understood the risks of 
leveraged CDOs despite being the kind of well-compensated advisor hired 
by large public entities. 
Ultimately, the trust collapsed, with the schools losing all of their $37 
million initial investment and Depfa seizing $163 million in collateral that 
secured the loans. Not surprisingly, the SEC is pursuing an enforcement 
action against Stifel. Instead of settling quickly like Goldman Sachs and 
others, Stifel is currently defending the suit,150 while RBC settled and 
agreed to pay a $30 million penalty.151 Although a portion of penalties paid 
to the SEC should find their way to the schools’ impoverished coffers, these 
amounts, together with any settlements recovered by the schools in private 
actions, will likely fall far short of covering the $200 million loss.152 
 
143  See Gretchen Morgenson, Finger-Pointing in the Fog, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2011, at BU1. 
144  See id. 
145  See Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges RBC Capital Markets in Sale of Unsuitable CDO 
Investments to Wisconsin School Districts (Sept. 27, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/
2011/2011-191.htm. 
146  See SEC Sues Over Wis. Schools’ $200M Loss, USA TODAY, Aug. 11, 2011, at 5B; Press 
Release, supra note 145. 
147  See Morgenson, supra note 143. 
148  See id. 
149  Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges Stifel, Nicolaus & Co. and Executive with Fraud in Sale of 
Investments to Wisconsin School Districts (Aug. 10, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/
2011/2011-165.htm. 
150  See Gretchen Morgenson, Police Protection, Please, for Municipal Bonds, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 
2012, at BU1. 
151  Press Release, supra note 145. Stifel is also pursuing a claim against RBC, alleging the bank did 
not disclose conflicts of interest in setting up the transaction. Morgenson, supra note 143. 
152  See Complaint, SEC v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., No. 2:11-cv-00755 (E.D. Wis. Aug. 10, 2011); 
Thomas O. Gorman, A Tale of Five School Districts and a Trusted Advisor, SEC ACTIONS (Aug. 11, 
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Like the Wisconsin schools, Jefferson County, Alabama, is another 
large public entity that recently suffered massive losses stemming from 
unanticipated risks associated with complex investment products. In the late 
1990s, in an attempt to fund liabilities stemming from environmental 
violations in its sewer system, Jefferson County began issuing bonds that by 
the early 2000s had a significant interest-rate swap component as an 
ostensible hedge arranged by J.P. Morgan Chase and Goldman Sachs.153 By 
2008, the would-be hedge had resulted in massive losses, and Jefferson 
County’s debt was downgraded to junk status.154 All told, they eventually 
ran up $647 million in losses and fees.155 While some losses were later 
cancelled as part of an SEC settlement,156 this did not prevent the county 
from filing for bankruptcy in November 2011, becoming the most 
expensive bankruptcy in U.S. history.157 The Jefferson County bankruptcy, 
fueled by losses on complex financial investments, dwarfed even the 
Orange County bankruptcy of nearly two decades earlier,158 although both 
stemmed in part from a similar cause: misguided bets on interest-rate 
derivatives. In the aftermath of the Jefferson County bankruptcy, the 
criticism of the participating investment banks was severe, with one 
attorney-banker who worked with the county labeling J.P. Morgan Chase 
and Goldman Sachs as nothing more than “bag-men, furthering the 
corruption” of local officials.159 
The Wisconsin schools, Jefferson County, and Orange County are not 
the only public entities that suffered massive investment losses on complex 
financial investments over the last few decades.160 As examples of a broader 
 
2011, 3:01 AM), http://www.secactions.com/?p=3523; Press Release, supra note 145; Press Release, 
supra note 149. 
153  See White, supra note 83, at 735–38 (“For many years it was known in financial circles . . . that 
J.P. Morgan was abusing Jefferson County in interest rate swap transactions. . . . ‘[A]buse’ understates 
the seriousness of J.P. Morgan’s actions.”). 
154  See Martin Z. Braun, Alabama County’s Debt Cut to Junk on Credit Squeeze, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 
29, 2008, 8:29 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=adq8QPXJc5zo&
refer=munibonds. 
155  J.P. Morgan agreed to forgive the $647 million and pay Jefferson County $50 million. See Brian 
Burnsed, Bond Debacle Sinks Jefferson County, BLOOMBERGBUSINESSWEEK (Nov. 8, 2009), http://
www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/content/nov2009/db2009118_722581.htm. 
156  See id. 
157  See Mary Williams Walsh, When a County Runs Off the Cliff, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2012, at 
BU1; Barnett Wright, Jefferson County Commission Votes 4–1 to File Nation’s Largest Municipal 
Bankruptcy, BIRMINGHAM NEWS (Nov. 9, 2011, 3:48 PM), http://blog.al.com/spotnews/2011/11/
jefferson_county_commission_vo_14.html. 
158  See Floyd Norris, Orange County Crisis Jolts Bond Market: From a Bankruptcy, Fears About 
Losses, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1994, at D1. 
159  White, supra note 83, at 738. The former county commissioner was ultimately convicted for 
taking kickbacks. See Burnsed, supra note 155. 
160  In the mid-1980s, the state of West Virginia sustained $280 million in losses on government 
bonds in a fund managed by Morgan Stanley. A West Virginia state appellate court set aside a $56.8 
million jury verdict for the state. State v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 459 S.E.2d 906, 910, 913 (W. Va. 
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phenomenon, they serve to illustrate the problems created by a system in 
which institutional investors, treated as sophisticated because of their size, 
are disadvantaged not once, but twice in the financial marketplace. They are 
taken advantage of on the front end of transactions by incompetent or 
unscrupulous actors like Stifel’s Noack and the “bag-men” at J.P. Morgan 
Chase and Goldman Sachs.161 And they are disadvantaged on the back end 
by the diminished legal protections afforded to wealthy investors in court 
and arbitration. To those indifferent toward the misfortunes of large banks 
and corporate behemoths like P&G, the damage to the coffers of school 
districts and municipalities already strapped for funds emphasizes the extent 
to which these debacles harm the greater public. 
The reaction of some members of the Wall Street community to the 
revelations about ABACUS and the Jefferson County bond losses suggests 
a willingness to rethink the treatment of investor sophistication. As a former 
head of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York remarked, “Wall Street 
cannot pretend anymore that the treasurer of a small town in the Midwest 
on a civil service salary and no analytical support has the same level of 
sophistication as a specialized hedge fund.”162 Even Goldman Sachs 
implicitly acknowledged this point in a May 2010 statement that promised 
it would review the firm’s practices with respect to, among other things, 
“the suitability of products for different types of clients.”163 
While some commentators acknowledge that these case studies suggest 
not all large investors should be treated as equally sophisticated, others 
have not divined the same lesson. Thus far, financial regulatory agencies 
like the SEC seem to view the antifraud provisions of securities laws as 
sufficient to police these sorts of abuses.164 However, there are two 
problems with this sort of approach. First, successful fraud claims require a 
 
1995). In the early 1990s, a nonprofit entity that operates the City Colleges of Chicago sustained $50 
million in losses on a $100 million investment in interest-rate-sensitive CMOs arranged by Westcap 
Securities. A Seventh Circuit district court granted Westcap’s motion to compel arbitration. Cmty. Coll. 
Dist. No. 508 v. Westcap Gov’t Sec., Inc., No. 94 C 1920, 1994 WL 530849, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 
1994). 
161  White, supra note 83, at 738. 
162  Seller’s Remorse?, supra note 25. 
163  Id. 
164  Events in early 2012 suggest the SEC is rethinking this position in some contexts. The SEC 
announced a review of the treatment of public entities by broker-dealers. Seemingly acknowledging 
large public investors are less sophisticated than private institutions, the SEC has indicated it will hold 
broker-dealers to a higher standard of care under the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority’s (FINRA) 
suitability rules when transacting securities in a public entity’s account. Tellingly, although the relevant 
regulations remain unchanged, the SEC has begun referring to such customers as “quasi-institutional” 
investors. See KATTENMUCHINROSENMAN LLP, THE SEC’S HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY OF BROKER-
DEALER MUNICIPAL SECURITIES UNDERWRITING AND PUBLIC ENTITY SALES PRACTICES (2012), 
available at http://www.kattenlaw.com/files/upload/The_SECs_Heightened_Scrutiny_of_Broker-
Dealer_Municipal_Securities_Underwriting_and_Public_Entity_Sales_Practices.pdf. 
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showing of scienter.165 Unless a customer is defrauded by a company like 
BT whose employees are willing to brag on video and audiotape about their 
misdeeds, this can be a major obstacle for a plaintiff. Second, and perhaps 
more importantly, “litigation is a poor substitute for regulation.”166 
Accordingly, an ex ante approach to this problem would be more efficient. 
In Part IV, two ex ante proposals are detailed: (1) revising the statutory 
benchmarks for sophistication to better reflect inflationary trends and the 
ability to bear economic risk and (2) raising the broker-dealers’ standard of 
care to a uniform fiduciary standard on par with that of investment advisers 
for customers both large and small. 
IV. PROPOSAL FOR REFORMING THE TREATMENT OF SOPHISTICATION IN 
STATUTORY EXEMPTIONS AND SUITABILITY CASES 
A. Consideration of Prior Proposals 
As noted earlier, criticisms of wealth- and size-based sophistication 
proxies date back to shortly after the introduction of the Regulation D safe 
harbor for nonpublic offerings.167 These criticisms have intensified in the 
wake of large losses by institutional investors as a result of the financial 
crisis of 2008. The criticisms typically propose one of two types of 
solutions. 
The first type argues that some sort of exam testing an investor’s 
financial knowledge (or that of the investor’s “purchaser representative”) 
would be an efficient substitute for the current heuristic wealth- and size-
based proxies. Typically, commentators who stress that wealth- and size-
based sophistication proxies are both over- and underinclusive tend to 
prefer a “financial literary test” as a solution.168 
To the extent these exam-based proposals emphasize how imprecise 
the current proxies are, I am sympathetic to them. However, there are 
important critiques of such proposals. As the case studies in Part III 
indicate, there is a tremendous range of contemporary investment products, 
 
165  While there are strict liability violations of the federal securities laws where scienter is not 
required (e.g., claims brought under § 12(2) of the 1934 Act or § 17(a)(2) and (3) of the 1933 Act), the 
Supreme Court has stated that scienter is an essential element of any private securities fraud action 
brought under § 10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule 10b-5. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 
197 (1976). In Aaron v. SEC, the Court extended this holding to cover SEC enforcement actions brought 
under § 10(b) and § 17(a)(1) of the 1933 Act. 446 U.S. 680, 696 (1980). Under the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act of 1995, private plaintiffs must satisfy a heightened pleading standard with 
respect to scienter. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1) (2006). 
166  Sorkin, supra note 131 (quoting Professor Erik F. Gerding). 
167  See supra note 73 and accompanying text. 
168  See Finger, supra note 22, at 763–66; Mary Kissel, Op-Ed., So Who Needs Wall Street?, WALL 
ST. J., Oct. 29–30, 2011, at A13 (interviewing the founder of an online trading platform who argues “an 
SEC-administered ‘financial literacy test’” would offer more effective investor protection than the 
current approach). 
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including everything from garden-variety equity securities, debt 
instruments, and plain-vanilla derivatives to highly leveraged interest-rate 
swaps and CDOs. Thus, financial literacy can mean very different things in 
different contexts, as the suitability guidelines propagated by SROs note.169 
Accordingly, it is hard to imagine any one exam of a reasonable length that 
could accurately measure an investor’s or a purchaser representative’s 
relevant knowledge in all such contexts. Given this, not one but many 
financial literary exams with varying levels of difficulty and emphases 
would need to be devised. While that may not be an insurmountable 
problem, it suggests this sort of proposal may not be as practical as it 
appears. 
A related concern with exam-based proposals stems from the fact that 
the staggering complexity of many contemporary investment products 
means financial literacy no longer affords the protection it once did. A 
January 2012 notice by the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority 
(FINRA) to its members on the “heightened supervision of complex 
products” conveys this point well.170 The notice offers a laundry list of 
dizzyingly intricate products, including: 
Structured notes with “worst-of” features, which provide payoffs that depend 
upon the worst performing reference index in a pre-specified group [and may] 
limit return of principal . . . if either reference index falls by a stated 
percentage (e.g., 30 percent) or if any of the reference indices decline in 
value . . . [and] structured notes [with] a payout structure that tracks the upside 
performance of a reference asset one-for-four, but if the reference asset’s 
performance exceeds a specified threshold the payoff is . . . much 
lower . . . regardless of how it performs afterward.171 
While it is conceivable that the FINRA members who design such 
byzantine products understand the risks for investors, the idea that 
institutions on the buy side can easily hire purchaser representatives to 
provide them with sufficient sophistication in such contexts strains 
credulity. 
A final objection to exam-based proposals relates to the underlying 
concern in these critiques about the unfairness of barring poorer investors 
from participating in investment opportunities available to wealthy 
 
169  The old National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) suitability rule, which was 
succeeded by FINRA’s Rule 2111 on July 9, 2012, stressed that a relevant consideration in determining 
an institutional investor’s ability to evaluate risk is “the complexity of the security or securities 
involved.” NASD Rule 2310, IM-2310-3 (2010), Suitability Obligations to Institutional Customers, 
available at http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_viewall.html?rbid=2403&element_id=3638&
record_id. 
170  FINRA, REGULATORY NOTICE 12-03: COMPLEX PRODUCTS: HEIGHTENED SUPERVISION OF 
COMPLEX PRODUCTS (2012), available at http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@reg/@
notice/documents/notices/p125397.pdf. 
171  Id. at 4, 5. 
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investors.172 In light of the misfortunes suffered by entities like the 
Wisconsin schools, Jefferson County, and Orange County that many would 
argue are not, and should not be, in the business of betting on CDOs and 
swaps with public money, it seems unwise to implement a policy change 
that makes it easier for members of the public with limited funds to learn 
the same hard lessons as these entities. 
A second type of proposal focuses on the fundamental flaws in the 
federal securities laws, seeing imprecise sophistication proxies as 
symptomatic of larger flaws. For example, Professor Thomas Lee Hazen 
argues that “whereas regulation of investments in securities and derivatives 
occurs primarily through disclosure requirements,” the close similarities 
between gambling, insurance contracts, and financial investing suggest that 
a regulatory approach modeled on the insurance industry would be more 
effective than the current laws.173 While pointing out the general 
“deregulatory trend in gambling activities” and “non-securities derivatives,” 
Hazen argues for a more “paternalistic approach” to financial regulation 
modeled on the insurance regulatory approach of “interpret[ing] insurance 
contracts to protect insureds.”174 
While many advocates of market efficiency would object to this self-
described “paternalistic” approach on ideological grounds,175 I do not find 
such objections persuasive in light of the losses and abuses detailed in Part 
III. Nonetheless, the considerable influence of antipaternalist advocates in 
the current debate on financial regulation suggests an overhaul of securities 
laws modeled on Hazen’s openly “paternalistic approach”176 is not 
politically pragmatic enough to succeed. 
B. Proposal for Modifying the Accredited Investor Standards and Other 
Statutory Exemptions 
Because they represent the lowest benchmarks for sophistication-based 
exemptions and the most outmoded with respect to inflation, Rule 215 and 
Regulation D’s $1 million net worth standard for individuals and married 
couples, $5 million standard for institutions, $200,000 annual income 
standard for individuals, and $300,000 standard for married couples are the 
proxies most in need of reform. Perhaps for these reasons, the SEC recently 
 
172  A recent news article noted the “outrage” about average investors being shut out of a 
contemplated private offering of shares of Facebook to Goldman Sachs’s “wealthiest clients,” a plan 
later scuttled in favor of an overseas offering due to regulatory concerns. Sullivan, supra note 16. 
173  Thomas Lee Hazen, Disparate Regulatory Schemes for Parallel Activities: Securities 
Regulation, Derivatives Regulation, Gambling, and Insurance, 24 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 375, 
375, 377–78 (2005). 
174  Id. at 430–40. 
175  For a sense of the antipaternalist arguments against financial regulation, see generally Shadab, 
supra note 20. 
176  Hazen, supra note 173, at 431. 
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finalized its treatment of a minor modification to the standards as directed 
by the Dodd–Frank Act.177 
In a December 2011 release, the SEC announced it will exclude the 
value of an individual or married couple’s primary residence from the net 
worth calculation, resulting in a constructive increase to the $1 million net 
worth standard for accredited investors who are homeowners.178 Somewhat 
blunting the impact of the change, however, indebtedness secured by a 
primary residence will not be treated as a liability unless the debt exceeds 
the home’s current market value.179 
Rather than a constructive increase in one of the four benchmarks, I 
would like to see more substantive changes, applied equally to the $1 
million and $5 million net worth benchmarks and the $200,000 and 
$300,000 annual income benchmarks. These changes would better reflect 
the most common justifications for wealth- and size-based sophistication 
proxies: (1) the increased ability of wealthy investors to “purchase” 
sophistication by hiring advisors and (2) the increased ability of wealthy 
investors to bear economic risk associated with investments. 
To better reflect the first justification for sophistication proxies, all four 
benchmarks should be immediately adjusted to reflect the inflationary 
erosion of the purchasing power represented by Regulation D’s thirty-year-
old benchmarks.180 As discussed in Part I, this would increase the net worth 
standard for individuals and married couples to $2.37 million and the 
standard for institutions to $11.87 million. This would also raise the annual 
income standards to $475,000 for individuals and $712,000 for married 
couples. In order to meet the continuous inflationary strain on buying 
power, all four benchmarks should be revisited every five years and 
readjusted by regulations to reflect any real-dollar-value impact of changes 
in an appropriate core price index. While there has been more modest 
inflationary erosion of the benchmarks for the Rule 144A QIB exemption 
and the qualified purchasers exemption in the 1940 Act, the same forward-
thinking modifications should be applied to these benchmarks as well. 
 
177  See Dodd–Frank Act § 413(b), Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1578 (2010); Net Worth 
Standard for Accredited Investors, Securities Act Release No. 33-9287, Investment Company Act 
Release No. 29,891, 76 Fed. Reg. 81,793, 81,794 (Dec. 29, 2011). 
178  Some of the nuances are intended to avoid penalizing an investor whose home mortgage is 
underwater. See Kenneth Muller et al., Securities Registration: A Revised Net Worth Standard for 
Accredited Investors, INSIGHTS, Mar. 2011, at 17. 
179  See Net Worth Standard for Accredited Investors, 76 Fed. Reg. at 81,795–96. 
180  In a different context, the SEC has finally acknowledged the wisdom of inflation-sensitive 
benchmarks. Recent revisions to Rule 205-3 of the Advisors Act will adjust for inflation the benchmarks 
for “qualified clients” that permit RIAs to charge performance-based fees to such customers. Inflation 
adjustments will continue in the future. See KENNETH J. BERMAN ET AL., AMENDMENTS TO THE 
ADVISERS ACT PERFORMANCE FEE RULE (2012), http://www.debevoise.com/files/Publication/62df9c46-
6b09-4597-b002-7c1c0b799949/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/ba2a6c12-35ee-4eac-b10f-
873b72a20ab6/AmendmentstoTheAdvisersActPerformanceFeeRule.pdf. 
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Although such steps would help ensure that the accredited investor 
standards and other benchmarks better track the ability of wealthy investors 
to “purchase” sophistication by hiring advisors, they would not address the 
second justification for such proxies, namely, that wealthy investors can 
better bear the economic risk associated with investments.181 In theory, no 
investor can better afford to lose 100% of their capital, regardless of their 
wealth. Nonetheless, there is no stipulation in Regulation D or Rule 215 
that accredited investors cannot invest 100% of their net worth in an exempt 
offering. To accurately reflect the “ability to bear the risk” justification, the 
benchmarks in Rule 215 and Regulation D should be modified to include 
what I call a “diversification-sensitive” component. Individual investors, 
married couples, and institutions who meet the respective benchmarks 
should be limited to investing up to 25% of their net worth in a § 4(5)-
exempt offering or a Regulation D private placement.182 
Although a 25% cap intended to encourage diversification on 
purchases by accredited investors would impede access to capital for 
businesses that rely on such low-cost exemptions, the impact could be 
softened by allowing individual investors, married couples, and institutional 
investors possessing double the net worth or annual income benchmarks to 
invest up to 50% of their net worth in exempt offerings while letting 
investors who can triple these benchmarks to invest up to 100%. Although 
an argument could be made that these graduated caps do not make sense to 
the extent they still enable an investor with triple the minimum net worth 
standard to lose everything on an investment, cap removal at a “super-net-
worth” or a “super-annual-income” level has the virtue of making the 
proposal more politically pragmatic. 
Although the recent revision to the Regulation D and Rule 215 
benchmarks falls short of extensive changes, the Dodd–Frank Act gives the 
SEC the ability to make significant revisions in this area. After July 21, 
2014, the net worth standard of $1 million will be open to adjustment by 
future rulemaking, with subsequent adjustments occurring “not less 
 
181  Net Worth Standard for Accredited Investors, 76 Fed. Reg. at 81,794. 
182  Recent commentators have proposed similar modifications. Andrew Abramowitz, a capital 
markets attorney, suggests a better accredited investor definition would limit what percentage of their 
net worth people can invest and have “a prohibition on participation in a new private placement if the 
investor’s previous investments in illiquid securities constitute a specified share of [the] investor’s liquid 
assets.” Sullivan, supra note 16. Professor John C. Coffee, Jr. argues that the definition should contain a 
standard for diversification capping investments in unregulated securities at 15% to 20% of net worth. 
Id. Although skeptics might suggest a diversification-sensitive component is unnecessary given that 
modern portfolio theory has conclusively demonstrated the benefits of diversification to investors, it is 
open to debate whether investors have taken such lessons to heart. See, e.g., Stephan Abraham, The 
Pitfalls of Diversification, INVESTOPEDIA (June 7, 2012), http://www.investopedia.com/articles/basics/
12/pitfalls-of-diversification.asp#axzz1yO5qSLXo (arguing that diversification may not be “all that it’s 
cracked up to be” from a cost–benefit standpoint). 
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frequently than once every 4 years thereafter.”183 In addition, § 415 of the 
Dodd–Frank Act requires the Comptroller General to undertake a study 
examining “the appropriate criteria for determining the financial 
thresholds . . . needed to qualify for accredited investor status and eligibility 
to invest in private funds.”184 Additionally, § 413(b)(2)(B) of the Dodd–
Frank Act gives the SEC authority to: 
by notice and comment rulemaking, make such adjustments to the definition of 
the term “accredited investor[,”] as defined in section 230.215 of title 17, Code 
of Federal Regulations, or any successor thereto, as such term applies to 
natural persons, as the Commission may deem appropriate for the protection of 
investors, in the public interest, and in light of the economy.185 
Although this passage unfortunately exempts the definition of accredited 
institutional investors from such revisions, the language allows for the 
wholesale modification of Regulation D’s sophistication proxies for 
individuals if the SEC can be convinced the current benchmarks are not in 
the public interest. 
C. Proposal for Modifying the Standard of Care Imposed on  
Broker-Dealers 
Under the Advisers Act, it is well-established that RIAs have a 
fiduciary duty to their customers, meaning that the customers’ interests 
must take priority in any transaction.186 In contrast, the debate over whether 
broker-dealers187 owe fiduciary duties to their customers has been long and 
contentious.188 Prior to the passage of the Advisers Act, early twentieth-
 
183  Dodd–Frank Act § 413(b)(2)(A), Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1578 (2010). Although 
the statute is not completely clear on this point, the income standards will presumably also be open to 
inflation adjustments. See J. Robert Brown Jr., The Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform Act and the SEC: 
Profound Bits and Pieces (Accredited Investor Standard), THERACETOTHEBOTTOM.ORG (Aug. 5, 2010, 
9:00 AM), http://www.theracetothebottom.org/dodd-frank/the-dodd-frank-wall-street-reform-act-and-
the-sec-profound-b-4.html. 
184  Dodd–Frank Act § 415, 124 Stat. at 1578; see also Net Worth Standard for Accredited Investors, 
76 Fed. Reg. at 81,795 (discussing possibility of review). 
185  Dodd–Frank Act § 413(b)(2)(B), 124 Stat. at 1578. 
186  See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
187  While RIAs are advisers or firms in the investment advising business that have registered with 
the SEC or a state securities board, broker-dealers are simply individuals or firms in the business of 
buying and selling securities. 
188  In 1999, the SEC proposed Advisers Act Rule 202(a)(11)-1, which would have allowed brokers 
to avoid fiduciary obligations even if they did not comply with the requirements of the broker-dealer 
exclusion in the Advisers Act, replacing the exclusion’s compensation rules with a modest disclosure 
requirement. The proposal generated 1700 comment letters. After shelving the proposed rule for several 
years, the SEC reproposed the rule in January 2005 and adopted it in April 2005. The D.C. Circuit Court 
of Appeals struck it down in 2007, Fin. Planning Ass’n v. SEC, 482 F.3d 481, 493 (D.C. Cir. 2007), 
which “threw into confusion the fundamental issues” in this area, Arthur B. Laby, Reforming the 
Regulation of Broker-Dealers and Investment Advisers, 65 BUS. LAW. 395, 410–12 (2010). By 2009, the 
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century courts typically viewed brokers as fiduciaries.189 In 1940, the 
Advisers Act bifurcated the regulatory structure, leaving some observers 
with the impression that brokers who were exempt did not owe fiduciary 
duties to customers, despite the fact that many of them have long provided 
advice to their clients.190 Adding to the confusion, there is still a minority 
rule holding that broker-dealers are fiduciaries whether or not they are 
RIAs.191 
If broker-dealers do not owe investors fiduciary duties, the brokerage 
firm and its employees must merely adhere to an ordinary negligence 
standard of care in dealing with customers.192 For wronged investors, this 
makes recovery in suitability cases—already difficult for sophisticated 
customers—all but impossible. In contrast, as a fiduciary, RIAs owe clients 
an affirmative duty to disclose material information.193 If a brokerage firm is 
held to this standard, it becomes a blatant violation of duty to arrange a 
transaction that a firm employee believes is a terrible investment for one 
party, as Goldman Sachs’s Fabrice Tourre allegedly did in the ABACUS 
transaction. 
While lobbyists for broker-dealers assert that the imposition of an 
unambiguous fiduciary duty would seriously harm the securities industry 
business model,194 there are forceful arguments on behalf of imposing one. 
The primary such argument, as the SEC notes, is that customers are 
frequently unsure whether or not they are owed a fiduciary duty in 
securities transactions.195 There are several reasons for this. 
 
dynamics of the debate had shifted, with an Obama Administration white paper calling for legislative 
reform to impose a fiduciary duty on brokers who provide advice to clients. Id. at 397. 
189  See, e.g., Batterson v. Raymond, 149 N.Y.S. 706, 711 (Sup. Ct. 1914); Haight v. Haight & 
Freese Co., 92 N.Y.S. 934, 936 (Sup. Ct. 1905); Wahl v. Tracy, 121 N.W. 660, 661 (Wis. 1909). 
190  See Laby, supra note 188, at 400 (“Brokers have always provided advice to their brokerage 
customers . . . .”). 
191  United States v. Wolfson, Nos. S1 00 Cr. 628(JGK), S1 02 Cr. 1588(JGK), 2008 WL 1969730, 
at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 5, 2008); Duffy v. Cavalier, 264 Cal. Rptr. 740, 751 (Ct. App. 1989). 
192  While the contemporary courts cited in note 191 supra have found broker-dealers subject to a 
fiduciary duty, the typical standard of care imposed is one of good faith and fair dealing. See SECTION 
913 STUDY, supra note 24, at 70–71. 
193  See SEC v. Bolla, 401 F. Supp. 2d 43, 66–67 (D.D.C. 2005) (noting that with the Advisers Act, 
Congress created “a fiduciary duty on the part of investment advisers to exercise good faith and fully 
and fairly disclose all material facts to their clients, and an affirmative obligation to employ reasonable 
care to avoid misleading [their] clients” (alteration in original) (quoting Morris v. Wachovia Sec., Inc., 
277 F. Supp. 2d 622, 644 (E.D. Va. 2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted)), aff’d sub nom. SEC v. 
Wash. Inv. Network, 475 F.3d 392 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
194  See, e.g., Letter from Ira D. Hammerman, Senior Managing Dir. & Gen. Counsel, Sec. Indus. & 
Fin. Mkts. Ass’n, to Mary L. Schapiro, SEC Chairman 4 (July 14, 2011), available at http://www.sifma.
org/issues/item.aspx?id=8589934675 (“SIFMA strongly opposes imposing on broker-dealers the 
existing Advisers Act standard together with its associated case law, guidance, and other legal 
precedent.”). 
195  See SEC 913 STUDY, supra note 24, at v. 
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First, the long-running debate and contradictory case law has failed to 
clarify the issue.196 Second, in recent years, brokerage firms have done a 
tremendous amount of marketing “touting their advisory functions” and 
blurring “the distinctions between the investment advisory profession and 
the broker-dealer profession.”197 The continually changing nomenclature of 
securities professionals has also further muddied the waters. As a 2008 
RAND Corporation study noted, typical job titles of employees in 
brokerage firms include financial advisor, financial consultant, financial 
representative, and investment specialist, all of which call to mind the 
duties of an RIA.198 Lastly, confusion also stems from the fact that unlike in 
the RIA context, customers do not always know in what capacity a broker-
dealer is serving—i.e., as a broker or a dealer—until the transaction is 
complete.199 
The divergent standards for RIAs and broker-dealers give rise to a 
series of questions. Is there any justification for imposing a lesser standard 
of care on broker-dealers compared to RIAs? If not, should we align the 
standards? If we should align the standards, should we do so for all 
customers or draw distinctions based on wealth or size? 
Given the uphill climb that wronged investors face in suitability cases, 
and the fact that this climb is even steeper for large investors, it makes 
sense to impose a heightened fiduciary standard of duty on broker-dealers 
equivalent to the one placed on RIAs by the Advisers Act. Notwithstanding 
the contrary suggestion of a recent SEC staff study on this topic,200 a 
uniform fiduciary standard should be in place irrespective of the wealth of 
the customer and irrespective of whether the firm acted as dealer or broker 
 
196  See supra notes 188–93 and accompanying text. 
197  Letter from Ron A. Rhoades, Dir. of Research, CCO, Joseph Capital Mgmt., LLC, to SEC 
Chairman & Commissioners 13 (Mar. 8, 2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s72599/
s72599josephcap.pdf; see also Laby, supra note 188, at 399–405 (“[C]hanges in . . . the labels [broker-
dealers] use for marketing . . . should subject brokers that provide advice to the Advisers Act.”). As 
Laby notes: 
The tidy separation between brokers and advisers began to crumble . . . in the 1980s when brokers 
started to offer financial planning services, and more significantly in the 1990s when brokerage 
firms began to use titles [that] . . . encouraged customers to think of the registered [broker-dealer] 
representative more as an adviser than a stockbroker. 
Id. at 404. 
198  ANGELA A. HUNG ET AL., INVESTOR AND INDUSTRY PERSPECTIVES ON INVESTMENT ADVISERS 
AND BROKER-DEALERS 74 (2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-1_
randiabdreport.pdf. 
199  See Laby, supra note 188, at 400 (“Broker-dealers in the United States have always acted as 
both agent and principal with respect to their customers. A broker acts as an agent, executing securities 
transactions on behalf of a customer, the principal, with another buyer or seller. A dealer acts as a 
principal, buying securities from or selling securities to a customer out of its own account.” (footnote 
omitted)). Frequently, broker-dealers do not notify a customer which role they played on a deal until the 
transaction is confirmed. 1 NORMAN S. POSER & JAMES A. FANTO, BROKER-DEALER LAW AND 
REGULATION § 1.04, at 1-20 to -23 (4th ed. 2007 & Supp. 2008). 
200  See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
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on the transaction in question.201 While the SEC staff study asserts that 
confusion is only likely with respect to smaller retail customers,202 the 
evidence suggests otherwise, given how common it is for large entities like 
CCM, SDCERA, and P&G to assert breach of fiduciary duty claims against 
investment firms and hedge funds once transaction value evaporates.203 
As suggested earlier, the fact that courts and arbitration panels presume 
large entities to be sophisticated means they are disadvantaged twice. On 
the front end, the statutory exemptions like those in Regulation D, § 4(5), 
and Rule 144A based on size or wealth mean institutional investors are not 
necessarily benefitting from the mandatory disclosures of a registration 
statement. Instead, they rely on the less fulsome disclosures of a private 
placement memo, their bargaining power, and their ability to hire advisors. 
While some commentators argue that this discrepancy does not 
disadvantage large institutions given their ability to bear the economic risk, 
the inflation-eroded numerical benchmarks and the lack of graduated caps 
in these exemptions undermine this argument. Meanwhile, on the back end, 
the ability of investment firms to employ the sophisticated investor 
affirmative defense in suitability cases based on a customer’s size or wealth, 
coupled with the prevalence of industry-standard mandatory arbitration 
clauses, means large entities are disadvantaged when it comes to legal 
remedies when investment value evaporates. 
D. Consideration of Counterarguments 
There are numerous potential counterarguments to the above two 
proposals. First, free market advocates would likely raise the same 
antipaternalist objections that could be directed at Professor Hazen’s 
proposed overhaul of securities laws modeled on existing insurance 
industry regulations. A related critique might be that large sophisticated 
actors require less regulatory protection because the negotiating leverage 
they possess renders regulation costly overkill that produces a suboptimal 
level of economic activity.204 However, a key point overlooked by the 
antipaternalist advocates concerns the utility of a limited form of 
 
201  Because investment firms trade as principals in addition to acting as intermediaries, some have 
argued it would not be feasible to require such firms to put customers first. While an important point, 
there are potential solutions such as stronger customer warnings or variations on the controversial 
Volcker Rule restricting proprietary trading. See, e.g., Letter from Ira Hammerman to Mary Schapiro, 
supra note 194, at 10. 
202  See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
203  Although alleging a breach of fiduciary does not necessarily establish a plaintiff’s confusion 
about the standard if the allegation is a cynical legal strategy, the fact that it is a colorable argument in 
such contexts suggests authorities recognize the potential for confusion here. 
204  See ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 730 (1986). 
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paternalism where there are severe asymmetries of information between 
parties of the kind that plague the financial markets.205 
A more difficult counterargument to answer is one that could be levied 
against any proposal that increases regulatory burdens in financial markets. 
Many anti-regulation voices emphasize the degree to which the economy is 
heavily dependent on the liquidity and investment capital provided by 
efficiently functioning capital markets. Any proposal that increases the 
compliance costs or liability exposure of issuers and broker-dealers is open 
to critique on the grounds that it will threaten the access to capital that fuels 
economic growth.206 
In response to concerns about capital formation, the best answer may 
be found in an amici curiae brief filed by two former SEC Chairs and a 
former Commissioner. The brief points out that concerns about increased 
liability exposure deterring firms from doing business in the United States 
may be misplaced because “in fact, investor faith in the safety and integrity 
of our markets is their strength. The fact that our markets are the safest in 
the world has helped make them the strongest in the world.”207 
The above statement underlines the fact that the goal is never simply to 
minimize regulatory burdens or liability exposure to the greatest extent 
possible. This would be as wrongheaded as seeking to maximize regulatory 
costs or liability exposure to the greatest extent possible. The sensible goal 
is to optimize the regulatory costs and burdens on actors in the marketplace. 
Given the massive losses suffered by large entities that purchased 
investment products they did not understand, the evidence suggests we are 
still below an optimal level of financial regulation. In large part, this is the 
result of regulators’ reliance on outmoded, simplistic sophistication proxies 
coupled with judges’ and arbitrators’ presumption of sophistication for 
large entities in contexts where the potential for predatory conduct by 
investment firms is not cabined by a uniform fiduciary duty standard. 
CONCLUSION 
Ultimately, the question posed by this Comment’s title—should size or 
wealth equal sophistication in federal securities laws?—must be answered 
 
205  See, e.g., Conference Paper, European Summer Symposium in Economic Theory, Alvaro 
Sandroni & Francesco Squintani, Paternalism in a Behavioral Economy with Asymmetric Information 2 
(July 10, 2006), available at http://www.cepr.org/meets/wkcn/6/6646/papers/Squintani.pdf (“When 
agents are fully rational, compulsory public insurance . . . may be a Pareto improvement in markets with 
asymmetric information.”). 
206  See, e.g., Joseph A. Grundfest, Why Disimply?, 108 HARV. L. REV. 727, 732 (1995) (“If there is 
excessive securities litigation, too many resources will be spent on litigation . . . . The cost of capital will 
then increase just as if a wasteful tax had been imposed on capital formation.”). 
207  Mot. for Leave to File Brief out of Time and Brief Amici Curiae of Former SEC Commissioners 
in Support of Petitioner at 9, Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC, v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148 
(2008) (No. 06-43), 2007 WL 2065260, at *9. 
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with a lawyerly equivocation: it depends. As things stand, there are serious 
flaws in the approach of federal securities laws to sophistication proxies 
based on size and wealth. Unless the existing benchmarks are adjusted for 
inflation on a going-forward basis and graduated caps on unregistered 
investments as a percentage of investor net worth are introduced, these 
proxies will continue to diverge from the justifications for exemptions 
originally expressed in Ralston Purina.208 These justifications—the main 
argument for the existence of sophistication proxies—are that investors 
with certain levels of wealth have the ability to “purchase” sophistication, 
wield bargaining power to extract disclosures, and better tolerate economic 
risk. The introduction of inflation adjustments and graduated caps on 
investments as a percentage of net worth will better serve such 
justifications. Nonetheless, the lack of a clear understanding of the duty 
owed to customers by broker-dealers suggests large investors will continue 
to receive less than optimal levels of protection unless a uniform fiduciary 
duty is imposed on broker-dealers in their dealings with both retail and 




208  SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953). 
